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Abstract 
We study the classic Gale (1963) economy using laboratory markets.  Tatonnement theory 
predicts prices will diverge from an equitable interior equilibrium towards infinity or zero 
depending only on initial prices.  The inequitable equilibria determined by these dynamics 
give all gains from exchange to one side of the market.  Our results show surprisingly strong 
support for these predictions.  In most sessions one side of the market eventually outgains the 
other by more than twenty times, leaving the disadvantaged side to trade for mere pennies.  
We also find preliminary evidence that these dynamics are sticky, resisting exogenous 
interventions designed to reverse their trajectories. 
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“[F]or the case of two goods, one always has global stability ... Nevertheless, some queer things 
can happen even in this case.” —David Gale (1963) 
 
General equilibrium theory is a cornerstone of modern economics and our core account of the 
nature of competitive markets.  However, the theory has usually been focused more on the 
existence and character of competitive equilibrium than on how, when and why economies come 
to be in equilibrium.  Given the computational and epistemic requirements for calculating a 
competitive equilibrium, it seems implausible that economic agents could ever “think” their way 
there.  More likely, adaptive dynamic processes govern disequilibrium prices, guiding them 
towards or away from equilibria.  Until and unless we understand these dynamic processes, it is 
difficult to assess general equilibrium theory's usefulness for predicting and explaining the 
behavior of competitive markets. 
On this front there has been no shortage of theory.  Accounts of disequilibrium dynamics 
stretch back to Marie-Esprit- Léon Walras (1877), and the quest for a satisfying theory was an 
active pursuit until the 1970s (e.g. Frank H. Hahn and Takashi Negishi (1962), Leonid Hurwicz 
et al. (1975), Hirofumi Uzawa (1962)) when it died off arguably for want of empirical 
nourishment.1  Modern observers have wondered whether existing theories of dynamics are 
empirically meaningful given that they are typically founded on some variation of tatonnement, a 
centralized price adjustment mechanism that differs substantially from most naturally occurring 
markets.  In a wide-ranging survey, James D. Duffie and Hugo F. Sonnenschein (1989) conclude 
that because actual market prices are not determined by the tatonnement mechanism, “few would 
argue today that it is a useful way to select from Walrasian equilibria.”  
Recently, laboratory research has stepped in to fill the empirical gap (e.g., Christopher M. 
Anderson et al. (2004), Steven Gjerstad (2007), Masayoshi Hirota et al. (2005), Charles R. Plott 
(2000), Plott (2001)) and findings have in fact been broadly supportive of Walras' hypothesis that 
price dynamics are intimately related to and driven by a market's excess demand.2   Moreover, 
this literature suggests that Walrasian notions of dynamics and stability have predictive power 
                                                 
1 A fact general equilibrium theorists sometimes lament (see for example Kirman, 1989). 
2 Marshallian dynamics, where quantities adjust given differences between buyer and seller prices, have been found 
to be more successful in economies with negative externalities (see Plott and Glen George, 1992), and positive 
externalities, (Plott and Smith, 1999) and recently in an economy with continuous probabilistic market entry 
(Michael Alton and Plott, 2009). 
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even in distinctly non-tatonnement market institutions (virtually all of this literature uses the 
double auction institution).3 
In this paper we provide a particularly strong test of the Walrasian hypothesis by 
experimentally studying a simple economy in which Walrasian dynamics predict highly 
implausible outcomes.  In the Gale (1963) two-good exchange economy, Walrasian dynamics 
push disequilibrium prices of the non-numeraire good away from an equitable (but unstable) 
interior competitive equilibrium towards infinity or zero.  Disequilibrium price paths eventually 
induce agents on one side of the market to give goods away for free, along with all gains from 
trade, within one of a pair of corner equilibrium sets.  Here, as in Thomas Balogh and Paul 
Streeten's (1951, p. 75) memorable phrase,  “the invisible hand does its work by strangulation.”4   
Remarkably, which side of the market gives away its goods depends not on structural parameters 
of the economy but purely on the market’s initial price and the dynamic path this price initiates.  
Powerful income effects generate positive excess demand (and upward price trajectories) at 
initial prices above the interior competitive equilibrium and negative excess demand (and 
downward trajectories) below.   
Gale’s economy provides an important stress test of the Walrasian hypothesis for two 
reasons.  First, the extreme Walrasian predictions for this economy are intuitively implausible 
and have perplexed economists for decades,5 whereas interior equilibration or global instability 
are highly appealing alternative hypotheses.  Indeed, the economy is often used as a reductio ad 
absurdum, a cautionary tale concerning the limits of aprioristic reasoning about markets.  John 
Chipman (1965) writes of the Gale example, "It is best to consider it as a sobering reminder that 
the pure theory admits of many strange possibilities that cannot be ruled out by a priori 
reasoning.”  It is precisely the fact the Gale example is transparently “strange” (Chipman, 1965), 
                                                 
3 Although modern theorists frequently motivate tatonnement by describing a fictional centralized mechanism, 
Walras himself did not use such a mechanism to motivate his theory.  In fact Walras conceived of tatonnement as a 
theory regarding the process governing decentralized markets (see Donald A. Walker (1996)).  Thus Walras would 
likely have been less surprised than modern observers to learn that tatonnement does a good job of anticipating the 
behavior of decentralized laboratory markets.  We thank Omar Al-Ubaydli for pointing this out to us. 
4 Gale’s example can be viewed as the limiting case of several well-known 2x2 economies with three competitive 
equilibria, the earliest due to Alfred Marshall (1879).  It is Marshall’s economy to which Balogh and Streeten refer. 
5 Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954, p. 269) assume that "impossible combinations of commodities, such 
as ... the consumption of a bundle of commodities insufficient to maintain life, are regarded as excluded" from the 
feasible set of consumption bundles.  John S. Chipman (1965, p. 730) infers from this passage that, “From this point 
of view, [the Gale corner solutions] do not qualify as equilibrium solutions, and the example becomes one of global 
instability,” before wryly observing, “It would certainly come as news to the inhabitants of many a poor country to 
learn that starvation had now become ‘impossible.’” 
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“queer” (Gale, 1963) and implausible that makes it a limiting robustness test for Walrasian 
dynamics.   
Second, the Gale example (unlike the similarly famous and previously studied three-good 
example of Herbert E. Scarf, 1963) is a two-good economy that can be easily implemented in a 
single commodity double auction with an equal number of net buyers and net sellers.  Price 
dynamics and their implications for each side of the market are utterly transparent, as 
participants need only pay attention to one price series to quickly understand the character of 
dynamics.  One side of the market has both sufficient information and powerful incentives to 
resist Walrasian price trajectories. 
This project began as a friendly debate among coauthors concerning the robustness of 
Anderson et al. (2004), which identified price cycles across periods in a laboratory 
implementation of Scarf’s example.  A reasonable inference from this research is that, where 
they conflict, Walrasian dynamics are more important predictors of outcomes than the fixed 
points that lie at the heart of equilibrium economics.  Two authors conjectured that given enough 
experience (here 13 or more trading periods per session, nearly double the number observed in 
Anderson et al.), large enough markets (10 subjects of each type, double the number per type in 
Anderson et al.), transparent enough dynamics (subjects can track dynamic trajectories by 
looking at only one price), and contemptible enough outcomes (in the Gale economy, half of the 
subjects’ earnings are devastated by dynamic trajectories), Walrasian dynamics would fail and 
criteria other than tatonnement would come to govern behavior.  In particular, the two skeptics 
conjectured that resistance to tatonnement dynamics by the disadvantaged side of the market 
would lead the economy to settle in a neighborhood of the equitable equilibrium, or produce 
signs of global instability instead of the clear trajectories of tatonnement. 
The skeptical authors were proved wrong.  We report robust evidence that prices in 
laboratory Gale economies resist the interior competitive equilibrium and march upwards or 
downwards towards the corner equilibria.  In fact, prices became as high or as low as one could 
expect given the discreteness of the space of goods in the lab economy so that subjects on the 
“wrong” side of the market were left trading their entire allotment of goods for a few pennies.  
We also discover that dynamics, once seeded, are sticky and difficult to reverse. 
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 A handful of earlier studies have shown emergent prices in partial equilibrium 
environments that disadvantage one side of the market (e.g. Vernon L. Smith, 1965).  What 
makes the Gale example curious is that the side of the market disadvantaged is not selected by 
structural features of the economy such as the number of traders, or the basic character of supply 
and demand.  Rather the losing side is driven by something as seemingly arbitrary as the 
economy’s initial trading prices and the dynamics these initial prices set off.   It is the inherently 
dynamic cause of extreme inequity and the existence of a reasonable alternative that makes the 
example so counterintuitive and the laboratory evidence supporting it compelling. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we review Walras’ 
theory of tatonnement, introduce our parameterization of a Gale economy, describe our 
experimental design, and lay out our primary experimental questions.  In Section 3 we present 
results from our experiment.  We conclude with a discussion of our results in Section 4.  
 
I. The Gale Example:  Theory and Experimental Design 
A.  Walrasian Dynamics and the Gale Example 
Tatonnement is the earliest and best known of the classical theories of market price dynamics.  
The process begins with an arbitrary vector of initial prices that induce a corresponding vector of 
excess demands.  If a good is in excess demand its price increases while its price decreases if the 
good is in excess supply.  This process is iterated indefinitely until excess demand for each good 
is zero and a competitive equilibrium is reached.  It is only in equilibrium that trades are actually 
executed and endowments adjusted.  Consider an economy with two commodities, x and y.  
Normalizing the price of y to one so that pt is the price of good x at time t, tatonnement 
adjustment in discrete time is given by the following difference equation: 
 
  txtt pZfpp 1  (1) 
 
where  tx pZ  is the excess demand for good x given pt, and f is a sign preserving function of 
excess demand.  A finite price 0* p  is a competitive equilibrium price if   0* pZ x .  A 
competitive equilibrium price is locally stable if there exists 0  such that for all 0  where 
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| | ,   0*  pZ x .  A competitive equilibrium price is globally stable if   0*  pZ x  
for all finite δ.  Local and global instability are defined similarly but the z()  conditions have 
opposite sign.6 
 We consider the variation on Gale’s (1963) economy represented by the Edgeworth box 
in the left portion of Figure 1.  The origin of agent 1’s coordinate axis is the lower-left corner of 
the Edgeworth box, while agent 2’s origin is the upper-right corner.  Agent i has Leontief 
preferences 
 
   iiiiiii byxayxU  ,min, . (2) 
  
The ray 0,,  yxbxay ii , depicted in the Edgeworth box by the black line segment for agent 
1 and the gray line segment for agent 2, is called the expansion path (a generalization of the offer 
curve) for agent i.  It represents the set of positive consumption bundles at which the entire 
                                                 
6 Scarf (1960) provided a 3-agent, 3-good economy with a unique competitive equilibrium that is globally unstable 
under the basic tatonnement adjustment procedure; tatonnement prices converge to a limit cycle about the 
competitive equilibrium.  Anderson et al. (2004) report that mean prices across periods track this limit cycle in a 
laboratory implementation of Scarf’s example. 
 
Figure 1:  Edgeworth box (a) and net supply and demand functions (b). 
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quantity of each good contributes to i’s utility (i.e. there are no wasted goods in bundles on this 
path).   
 Given endowment  yixi ww , , agent i's (interior) demand is determined by the intersection 
of her budget line at the prevailing price and the expansion path.  It is straightforward to show 
that the demand functions are given by 
 
pa
bwpwpx
i
i
y
i
x
i
i 
*  and    
pa
pbwpwapy
i
i
y
i
x
i
i 
* , 
and that the excess demand for good x in the economy is  
 
pa
m
pa
mpZ x  2
2
1
1 , where xiii
y
ii wabwm  . 
Provided an interior competitive equilibrium exists, its associated price is  
21
1221*
mm
mamap 
 . 
In Online Appendix A we derive these functions and show that the interior equilibrium is 
unstable if and only if m1+m2>0. 
In Figure 1 and our experiment we set 5.351 a , 13491 b , 6582 a , and 39472 b 7 
with endowments    400,15, 11 yx ww  and    5600,5, 22 yx ww .  These parameters generate an 
interior competitive equilibrium (ICE) price 158* p .  Of course our laboratory implementation 
is discrete so the ICE is actually a cone  172,147p  emanating from the endowment allocation 
and centered on the confluence of the expansion paths (this cone is drawn with dotted lines in the 
Edgeworth box in Figure 1).  The right panel of Figure 2 provides another view of the discretized 
economy, plotting net supply and demand functions of good x with respect to the endowment.  
Net supply and demand are equal within the ICE bounds, resulting in zero excess demand in the 
competitive price tunnel  172,147p .  
The ICE is interior, equitable (each party receives identical payoffs and gains from trade 
under our payoff scaling), and is defined by an excess demand of zero.  However, it is globally 
unstable under tatonnement.  At prices higher than (clockwise from) the ICE price, agent 2’s 
demand for good x exceeds agent 1’s supply, generating positive excess demand and, by (1), 
                                                 
7 These are approximate; precise values are given in Online Appendix A. 
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causing prices to rise away from the ICE.  At prices lower than (counter clockwise from) the ICE 
price the reverse is true and, by (1), prices will fall away from the ICE. 
 
Walrasian dynamics drive adjustment until prices reach either zero or infinity8 and can no 
longer adjust in the direction of excess demand.  These prices are, by convention, competitive 
equilibrium prices though of an odd form since excess demands are far from zero.  These corner 
prices generate a range of allocations (we call them corner competitive equilibria or CCE) that 
are (weakly) optimal but highly inequitable.  In either CCE, one agent gives away some amount 
of a commodity to the other for free along with all of the gains from trade.  Which CCE is 
selected and which side of the market is disadvantaged in equilibrium depends entirely upon 
initial prices and the dynamics they ignite. 
 
B.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
In order to assess the empirical content of the extreme tatonnement predictions in Gale’s 
economy, we examined a series of discrete-good laboratory markets parameterized as above.  In 
each of 8 sessions9 between 12 and 20 subjects traded for approximately 3 hours.  In each session 
half of the subjects were assigned agent 1’s preferences and endowments and half agent 2’s, 
forming a replica of the economy described above. 
Sessions were divided into a sequence of 13-15 trading periods each lasting 6-15 minutes.  
Period lengths within each session started high and were gradually decreased as subjects became 
more comfortable with the trading environment.10  Trade was conducted via computerized 
continuous double auction using MarketScape software and traders bought and sold units of x 
using the numeraire y as the medium of exchange.  Subjects tracked their potential earnings 
using a special graphical program implemented in Excel that allowed them to visualize their 
induced indifference curves and expansion paths and quickly calculate the payoff consequences 
of prospective trades.  Screenshots of these programs are presented and discussed in Online 
Appendix C. 
                                                 
8 In a discrete implementation of this economy, p≥2,800 actually induces a stable “near corner” equilibrium where 
one unit of good x is exchanged. 
9 There was also a pilot session using different utility parameters. 
10 Specifically, there was a paid training period of 15 minutes at pre-specified prices.  The first “real” period was 15 
minutes long, the second 12 minutes, the third 10 minutes, the fourth 8 minutes, and the rest 6 minutes. 
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As with most market experiments, implementation was via stationary repetition.  At the end 
of each period subjects earned cash payments (paid at the end of the session) based on their 
ending allocations and induced utility functions and allocations were returned to endowment 
levels for the next period of trade.  Stationary repetition is especially useful in our study because 
tatonnement dynamics assume price adjustments at a fixed endowment.  By resetting 
endowments at the beginning of each period, we can neatly map Walrasian predictions onto the 
sequence of period average prices.   
 The session design is summarized in Table 1.  Each session opened with a block of 
periods we call the Primary phase.  In half of the sessions we allowed Primary phase prices to 
initiate freely.  We call these Primary-Free sessions.  In the other half we controlled the sign of 
initial excess demand using price controls; we call these Primary-Control sessions.  Following 
the Primary phase we attempted to reverse observed price dynamics by switching the sign of the 
market’s excess demand using price controls.  We refer to these later periods as the Reversal 
phase.  The period in which we began the Reversal phase was triggered by a determination of 
price convergence.  In several sessions, time permitting, we lifted price controls in the final 
period of the Reversal phase.  In the Price Control columns of Table 1, we specify what types of 
price controls were implemented and in which periods.  So, for example, in the Primary phase of 
Session 6 a price floor above the ICE was imposed during the first 7 periods and was lifted 
during periods 8 and 9.  During the Reversal phase, a price ceiling below the ICE was imposed 
during periods 10-14 and lifted in period 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Primary Phase Reversal Phase 
Session Market Size Price Control Free Prices Price Control Free Prices 
1 12  1-14   
2 20  1-9 Ceiling : 10-12 13 
3 20 Ceiling: 1-4 5-8 Floor: 9-14  
4 20 Ceiling : 1-11 12 Ceiling : 13-14  
5 20 Floor: 1-8 9 Ceiling : 10-14  
6 20 Floor: 1-7 8-9 Ceiling : 10-14 15 
7 20  1-5 Ceiling : 6-14 15 
8 16  1-4 Ceiling : 5-13  
 
Table 1: Summary of session design. 
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Subjects received extensive training and instruction prior to trading.  Instructions 
concerning both the character of preferences and the details of the MarketScape interface were 
distributed and read aloud to subjects; these instructions are included in Online Appendix C.  
After reading instructions, subjects engaged in a period of paid trade at a fixed price, allowing 
them to learn how to calculate earnings and submit orders without being allowed to engage in the 
strategy of setting prices.  This gave them experience with their induced preferences and with the 
mechanics of the double auction.11  
We chose parameters to achieve several goals.  First, to allow only discrete trades while 
maintaining a sufficiently fine price grid, the numeraire good y is scaled to a much larger number 
of units than the commodity good x -- a conventional normalization of the Edgeworth box in 
general equilibrium experiments.  We also included an additive constant in the induced utility 
function (not in Gale’s original economy) that allows us to keep the volume of orders reasonably 
low while maintaining a relatively narrow ICE price tunnel.  Economies with lower trading 
volumes take less time to clear than economies with higher volumes, allowing us to run shorter 
(and thus more) periods. 
We adopted a non-linear, monotone-increasing exchange rate from induced utils (that is, 
Ui(xi,yi) in (2)) to dollars in order to equalize total payoffs at all three equilibria and create 
symmetry in relative inequality at the two corner equilibria.  The map from price to profit is 
shown in Figure 3.  At the ICE price of 158 (and corresponding ICE allocation), subjects of both 
types earn $3 per period.  At her “good” (“bad”) corner equilibrium a subject of either type earns 
$5 ($1).  As is clear from Figure 2, there is a rough symmetry between the two subject types with 
respect to the marginal impact of price changes on profits so that any price change is an 
approximately zero sum transfer from one subject type to the other.  If our util-to-dollar 
exchange rate had instead been linear and, for example, we had normalized the ICE and “bad”  
                                                 
11 We varied the training period price from session to session; this price was 120 in session 1, 90 in sessions 2-4, and 
275 in sessions 5-8. Thus half of the training prices were initiated in a region of negative excess demand, the other 
half in a region of positive excess demand.  While the training price may potentially influence the initial prices in 
period 1, our objective is to study the evolution of prices over time, wherever they happen to start; disequilibrium 
theory is generally silent on where initial prices come from.  In fact, the sign of excess demand at training prices was 
a poor predictor of the sign of excess demand at subsequent period 1 prices, as two of four Primary-Free sessions 
immediately exited the signed region of excess demand in which they were trained.   
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CCE payments to be $3 and $1per period, respectively, then the p=0 CCE payment for type 2 
agents (their “good” equilibrium) would only equal $3.57.  Thus incentives for these subjects 
would have been low relative to type 1 subjects for prices below the ICE range (the same holds 
true for type 1 agents in the high-price CCE).  
 
C.  Experimental Questions 
Our design permits investigation of four main questions.  The first is whether the interior 
competitive equilibrium range is behaviorally stable.  When prices are in the ICE, do they stay 
there?  Do prices outside of the ICE move towards the ICE over time?  The former is a measure 
zero event in the continuous economy if the initial price is drawn from a continuous distribution, 
but of practical interest in our discrete implementation.  The latter seeks to identify expressly 
anti-tatonnement dynamics, where prices move opposite the sign of excess demand. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Total predicted earnings of both sides of the market as a function of price. 
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Question 1: Is the interior CE behaviorally stable? 
 
If the ICE is unstable in the sense that prices are not drawn to it, it is still possible that prices 
show signs of global instability by failing to follow a clear trajectory.  Our second question is 
therefore whether there is a strong (and direct) correspondence between the sign of excess 
demand and the direction of period to period price adjustments as tatonnement predicts:  
 
Question 2: Are price dynamics Walrasian? 
 
Even if prices move in a relatively orderly fashion towards the corner competitive equilibria, it is 
possible they could stabilize in a neighborhood “far” from CCE prices (in Section 3 we argue the 
appropriateness of using a payoff-normalized measure of distance from CCE prices).  It is the 
prediction of corner convergence that seems most implausible ex ante, thus our third question is 
whether this implausible prediction bears out in the data. 
 
Question 3:  Do prices reach corner equilibria and are these equilibria behaviorally stable? 
 
We answer these three questions using the Primary phase data.  Our final question is whether we 
can actually reverse the trajectory of prices by exogenously changing excess demand.  An 
alternative hypothesis is that Primary dynamics, once established, are sticky. 
 
Question 4:  Can Primary phase price dynamics be reversed? 
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Figure 3:  Price series from sessions 1-4.  Vertical lines demarcate periods and horizontal dotted 
lines show ICE bounds.  Arrows ending in horizontal gray dashed lines designate price controls. 
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Figure 4:  Prices from session 5-8.  Vertical lines demarcate periods and horizontal dotted 
lines show ICE bounds.  Arrows ending in horizontal gray dashed lines designate price controls. 
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II. Results 
A.  Primary dynamics 
Figures 3 and 4 display transaction prices from each session of the experiment.  Periods are 
separated by vertical gray lines, phases by vertical black lines, and the ICE bounds are 
demarcated by horizontal dashed lines.  Dotted lines at the end of arrows represent price controls 
(downward arrows are price ceilings, upward arrows price floors).  We focus on the Primary 
phase dynamics and later consider the Reversal phase. 
In session 1 early first period transactions are within or very near the ICE bounds, and 
prices stay centered there for the remainder of the session.  In every other session prices begin 
outside the ICE and never enter its bounds (one early transaction in session 2 notwithstanding). 
Indeed, as we’ll confirm below, Primary prices always trend away from the ICE from period to 
period: When prices initiate above the ICE, they explode to an order of magnitude above it.  
When they initiate below, prices collapse to nearly (and sometimes exactly) zero.  Prices within 
period also show a systematic tendency away from the ICE.  These tendencies match Walrasian 
predictions; prices above the ICE generate positive excess demand and prices below negative 
excess demand.  These observations answer our first question and provide us with our first result: 
Result 1: The interior competitive equilibrium is behaviorally unstable.  When prices initiate 
inside the ICE they stay there.  When they initiate outside of the ICE they show no systematic 
tendencies towards it over time. 
  
Free session excess demand is endogenous, making it difficult to be sure it is causally 
related to price movements.  Prices that initiate at positive excess demand also initiate high; 
perhaps the climbing prices we observe in Free sessions reflect a dynamic tendency that 
codetermines initial price and the price gradient.  It is possible that excess demand is not in fact 
causally related to excess demand. 
To better identify the relationship between excess demand and price, we exogenously 
controlled and varied initial excess demand in half of our sessions (sessions 3, 4, 5 and 6). In 
sessions 5 and 6 we used price floors in the first few periods to force excess demand at initial 
prices to be positive.  In sessions 3 and 4 we forced prices to initiate with negative excess 
demand using price ceilings.  Dynamics in these sessions are also Walrasian; sessions with price 
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ceilings below the CE have prices dropping towards 0 while sessions with price floors above the 
CE have prices that rise far above the ICE bounds.  Moreover, in each of these sessions we lifted 
price controls and prices continued both between and within period on their original trajectories, 
sometimes after a brief but unsuccessful surge in the opposite direction.12  Via exogenous 
treatment variation we are able to infer that dynamics are in fact caused by excess demand. 
To test the Walrasian hypothesis more formally we calculate, for each session, the Mann-
Kendall   [1,1], an ordinal, non-parametric measure of trend, for weighted average price 
across periods.13  In sessions in which initial weighted average prices are at positive excess 
demand   is nearly 1, indicating strong positive price trend, while in sessions with negative 
excess demand   is close to -1.  These measures are significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level in sessions 2-7.  In session 8   is very close to 1 (0.999), but the small number of 
Primary periods allows us confidence at only the 10 percent level. These statistics generate our 
second result: 
Result 2:  Primary disequilibrium price dynamics are Walrasian.  From period to period, prices 
move significantly in the direction of the sign of excess demand.  
 
Within period, endowments adjust at each transaction price in the double auction so 
theoretical models of price dynamics within periods are difficult at best.  For example, 
tatonnement models typically assume stationary endowments.  Nonetheless, in Figures 3 and 4 
the trend in prices within period is obvious:  Under positive excess demand, prices virtually 
always rise within period, and under negative excess demand they nearly always fall. 
To check this more formally, we calculate the Mann-Kendall   for prices and time within 
period for each disequilibrium period in the Primary phase.  In all Primary phase periods but one 
(period 9 of session 6) we observe significant trend within period.   
In these periods with significant trend, prices universally match excess demand at both 
the current and previous average price.  We document this as a further result: 
                                                 
12 In fact, these brief surges provide particularly strong tests of Walrasian dynamics “near” the CCE; the lifting of 
the price control is used by some subjects as a device to coordinate on anti-tatonnement pricing.  These resistance 
attempts universally fail and end up being very short-lived as they are quickly overpowered by Walrasian forces. 
13 Similar results obtain using cardinal correlation measures such as Pearson’s  . In Online Appendix B we report 
parametric tests of price dynamics both within and between period using standard panel data techniques and find 
similar results. 
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Result 3:  The sign of disequilibrium price movements within period matches the sign of excess 
demand. 
 
Although there is clear evidence that tatonnement gets the sign right, there is little 
evidence in our data of a relationship between the magnitude (of the absolute value) of excess 
demand and the size of price changes.14  This reflects the challenge to theory presented by Gale 
economies with parameters such as ours.  Excess demand (or supply) increases as the economy 
moves towards corner equilibria.  However as the economy approaches equilibrium incentives to 
trade begin to evaporate.  These slowdowns could have the effect of dampening price changes at 
high excess demand (or supply) and make it difficult to observe any latent magnitude effects.  It 
seems that the very features of the Gale example that generate its extreme predictions also makes 
it a challenging arena for understanding the structural relationship between price changes and 
excess demand.15 
 
B.  Convergence and Reversal 
Disequilibrium prices show a strong tendency away from the interior equilibrium and 
towards the corner equilibria.  How close to the corner equilibria do our markets come? 
Our restriction of trade to the integer grid actually implies finite p≥2800 are competitive 
equilibrium prices, where each type 2 (1) subject buys (sells) one unit of x.  In such equilibria the 
payoff to each type 2 (1) subject is $1.07 ($4.68); recall that subjects earn $1 each at their 
endowments, so type 2 subjects are very nearly supplying good y for free.  Thus prices of 
p≥2800 would certainly suggest “corner” prices. 
But consider optimal symmetric (by type) trade at a price less than 2800 but still “large”.  
For p≥1446 the profit of each type 1 subject is $4.68, the same as in the (discrete) “corner” 
equilibrium (see Figure 3).  Therefore there should be no pressure from the supply side for prices 
                                                 
14 An econometric analysis of the relationship between excess demand and price movements between periods is 
provided in Online Appendix B.  See also Hirota et al. (2005) for similar findings in laboratory Scarf economies.  
They do find quantitative relationships but the dynamics become complicated by the multiple market setting they 
study.   
15 Gjerstad (2007) studies a laboratory economy that does not have this feature of the Gale economy and thus 
manages to get a clear picture of the parameters in that environment.  He estimates parameters governing both 
tatonnement (between period) and Hahn and Negishi (within period) processes and finds strong support for 
magnitude effects. 
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to go any higher.  However, at p=1446 the type 1 subjects supply one unit of x each while the 
type 2 subjects demand three units, so there is substantial excess demand. 
How salient is this excess demand?  When p=1446, if the demand of a type 2 subject 
were fulfilled she would earn $1.28, but under optimal symmetric trade (so that she is only able 
to acquire 1 unit of x) she earns $1.07.  Therefore the excess demand is worth $0.21.  Since 
symmetric optimal profits are constant for p≥1446 and excess demand is worth a fairly small 
amount ($2-3 over the course of an entire session), p=1446 seems like a natural benchmark for 
convergence to a near-corner price (and 7 cents a benchmark corner trading profit for a price-
disadvantaged subject).  It is worth noting that the “demanded” profit for type 2 subjects shrinks 
steadily as prices increase in the interval  1643,1446p , above which a type 2 subject demands 
profit of $1.16 for all  2494,1643p  (so excess demand is only worth $0.09 in this interval) 
before again declining towards $1.07.  Given this wide band (in prices) of profit non-
monotonicity with such small “lost” profit attached to excess demand, p≥1643 is practically an 
equilibrium price. 
By comparison, the payoff gradient on the price path to the p=0 equilibrium is relatively 
smooth.  For symmetry we consider the lower near corner range to be any price that yields 
trading profit of 7 cents or less to the type 1 subjects; this is true at any p≤19. 
Figure 5 plots end-of-period prices (weighted average transaction price during the final 
minute of the period) for each session-phase combination. For visibility across vastly different 
scales, the data is divided into a panel for periods initiating with positive excess demand and a 
separate panel for periods initiating with negative excess demand.  Primary dynamics are plotted 
in black; price control periods are linked by solid lines while free periods are linked by dotted 
lines.  Horizontal black lines show the bounds for our “near corner” prices both on the high and 
low end.  In all 7 disequilibrium sessions we observe prices entering this range by the end of the 
Primary phase.  Mean prices therefore reach levels extremely close in payoff space to CCE 
prices. 
Result 4:  Prices converge to close neighborhoods of corner competitive equilibrium prices.  
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Figure 6:  Average share of gains from trade for type 1 subjects by phase, period-within-
phase and session. 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  End of period prices by session. 
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It is important to consider measures of corner equilibration other than price convergence. 
Convergent prices are useful, but unavoidably conceal heterogeneity inherent in the double 
auction institution that particularly matter in general equilibrium settings.  Double auction 
markets are cleared not at a single price within-period but at a host of prices evolving over the 
period’s duration.  Moreover, subjects need not submit optimal demands at each transaction 
price.  Indeed it is typical to observe individual subjects making multiple trades at multiple prices 
over the course of a single period. 
We can sidestep these problems by directly studying the final allocations achieved by the 
market; how “close” are these allocations to corner equilibrium allocations?  A simple metric of 
linear distance in the Edgeworth box is of limited value because of the highly nonlinear nature of 
rewards in this space, because there are a large set of equilibrium allocations from which to 
benchmark distance, and because allocations are restricted to a discrete grid, (meaning both that 
a range of prices typically support identical levels of demand and supply and that a single price 
tick can imply a discrete jump in excess demand).  An appealing alternative is to examine 
inequity across player types in the achieved gains from trade (relative to the endowment), a one-
dimensional measure that is increasing as allocations move from the ICE towards either CCE.16  
This measure is also a particularly strong test of corner convergence in that it measures the 
aspect of the corner equilibria that seemed least plausible, ex ante. 
For each period, we calculate the share of total gains from trade achieved by the type 1 
side of the market.  At the upper corner (for p≥1446) the benchmark symmetric optimal measure 
is 0.981 while at the lower corner (for p=19) it is 0.019.  In Figure 6 we plot these benchmarks as 
dashed horizontal lines.  We also include the symmetric optimal benchmark gains at the upper 
and lower bounds of the ICE in dashed green. 
For each session and period we plot the evolution of type 1’s average share of the market, 
with a separate panel for the Primary and Reversal phases.  Primary phase results are compelling.   
In session 1 where prices initiated in the ICE tunnel gains from trade are close to evenly split.  In 
                                                 
16 Note that, total gains from trade vary little at optimal or near optimal demands in our parameterization of the Gale 
economy; the main effect of a change in price on payoffs is in relative shares of the gains from trade earned by each 
side of the market.  Online Appendix B presents plots showing flat total gains from period to period. 
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all disequilibrium periods prices move decisively17 away from equity, generally ending with one 
side of the market earning in excess of 95% of the gains from trade.  These shares come very 
close to those obtaining at corner equilibria.18 
Result 5:  Out of equilibrium dynamics lead one side of the market to capture nearly all gains 
from trade, eventually more than 20 times that of the other side.  These inequities are close to 
those predicted at corner equilibria. 
 
Primary phase data converged quickly19 so in sessions 2-8 we attempted to reverse the 
dynamics, using price controls to switch the sign of excess demand.  The results of this effort 
were mixed and our data, though preliminary, suggests that dynamics are sticky once seeded.  In 
sessions 5 and 6 prices do drop substantially over time in an apparent successful reversal while in 
sessions 3,7 and 8 they consistently hug the price constraint (in 2 and 4 there is too little data to 
make a call).  In three sessions (2,6 and 7) we eventually lifted the constraint and in each case 
prices leapt past the ICE, returning to their Primary phase trajectories (see the right hand panel of 
Figure 5 for a clear view).20  We therefore conclude 
Result 6:  Dynamics once established are typically sticky and difficult to reverse with price 
controls.   
 
III.  Discussion 
Much of the appeal of experiments lies in their capacity to surprise us.  They often do this by 
providing us with evidence that intuitive theories can fail to predict behavior but also by showing 
us that highly counterintuitive theories can succeed in predicting behavior.  We have taken one 
of the more counterintuitive theoretical examples in economics and provided evidence that it 
precisely anticipates outcomes in laboratory markets.  In the process we have provided new 
                                                 
17 In session 3 there is a temporary spike towards equity when price controls are relaxed but shares quickly plummet 
back towards zero. 
18 Note that although earnings shares change dramatically over the course of sessions, total realized payoffs hardly 
change at all.    Earnings are moreover very close to predicted levels indicating markets are relatively efficient in 
that subjects typically extract nearly all of the gains from trade.  Details are provided in Online Appendix B. 
19 Though in Online Appendix B we provide suggestive evidence that prices had generally not yet finished moving 
by the close of the Primary phase and likely would have continued to move away from the ICE had we extended the 
duration of the Primary phase with additional periods. 
20 In Online Appendix B we discuss the Reversal phase in more detail and provide preliminary evidence suggesting 
that overtrading by the disadvantaged side of the market is a proximate cause of the failure of dynamics to reverse. 
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evidence that Walrasian-like dynamics govern price adjustment in general equilibrium 
environments. 
Prices in our markets generally initiate outside of the economy’s conventional and 
equitable competitive equilibrium.  When they do, as predicted, prices either explode or collapse 
to nearly zero, driven by nothing but dynamic forces set off by initial prices.  These forces 
continue to exert influence even at extreme prices, resulting eventually in one side of the market 
giving away its endowment for pennies and the other harvesting nearly all of the gains from 
exchange.  
Although the extremity of the results seemed unlikely ex ante (at least to two of the 
authors), they come about for ultimately economically sensible reasons.  Indeed the Walrasian 
dynamics driving our results are simply a general equilibrium analogue of our standard textbook 
explanation of equilibration in simple supply and demand markets.  Because of the Gale 
economy’s powerful income effects, prices greater than the interior CE induce buyers to demand 
more units than sellers are willing to supply.  Buyers, scrambling to acquire scarce units, bid 
prices up and because no fixed point exists to extinguish this process prices continue moving 
ever upward.21  Symmetric arguments hold when prices begin below the interior equilibrium; 
low prices cause a glut of supply and drive prices downwards in a process that only ends at 
prices near zero.   
Chipman (1965) makes the case that the Gale example “is a special limiting case, and 
should not be taken too seriously as providing an illustration of any real situation.”  While 
strictly speaking we agree, CES preferences can generate economies with multiple equilibria that 
have qualitatively similar but less extreme dynamics22 and we suspect that our basic findings 
concerning the character of Walrasian dynamics are transferable to these more realistic (and 
more moderate) settings.  Regardless, our interest in the Gale economy derives not from its 
realism but instead from the particular stress it imposes on Walrasian predictions.  It is because 
nature rarely produces environments this tough that a laboratory test is particularly informative.  
The implication of our research is that classical classifications of the stability of 
equilibria are empirically meaningful, even when markets are not cleared in a tatonnement 
                                                 
21 Of course in our discrete implementation the incentives to continue driving prices eventually go to zero. 
22 See Chipman (2010) and Online Appendix A for more details. 
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institution and even when the implications of stability classifications are quite extreme.  We 
believe our paper, in conjunction with the handful of recent papers on the topic, represents a 
broad empirical vindication of much classical general equilibrium theorizing on out-of-
equilibrium dynamics. 
 Our paper advances a small prior literature on dynamics in economies with unstable 
interior equilibria. Anderson et al (2004) and Hirota et al (2005) study Scarf's (1963) three good 
economy which has a single, theoretically globally unstable interior equilibrium.  They report 
evidence that this economy is indeed globally unstable; prices cycle about the equilibrium, as 
predicted by Walrasian dynamics, but do not converge to equilibrium during the three hour 
sessions.  Indeed, Hirota et al (2005) studies parameterizations with theoretically divergent 
cycles and provides evidence that prices in fact move modestly away from the interior 
equilibrium over time.  The first to demonstrate that income effects can produce market 
instability was Plott (2000), who examines two-good economies with downward sloping supply 
curves for the non-numeraire good, generating multiple interior (in payoff space) equilibria. He  
reports evidence that Walrasian stability classifications are good predictors of convergence. 23 
Like Anderson et al (2004) our economy has a unique and unstable interior equilibrium, 
though like Plott (2000) a stable alternative equilibrium exists.   Unlike both of these strands of 
work, the Gale example has two symmetric stable alternative equilibria, each deeply inequitable 
relative to the unstable interior alternative.  On one hand substantial experimental evidence 
favoring Walrasian dynamics suggests economies should equilibrate at these inequitable corner 
outcomes.   On the other hand, there is a large experimental literature suggesting that, in part 
because of social preferences, equitable distributions tend to be focal, especially in ex ante 
symmetric environments like ours. This evidence appeals to a compelling intuition that the 
interior but unstable outcome is more likely to emerge. Because the Gale environment pits 
Walrasian dynamics so strongly against intuitions (and evidence) regarding individuals' 
preferences, it poses a considerably more strenuous test of Walrasian dynamics than previous 
work.   Our results highlight in a particularly sharp way the fact that market dynamics are 
                                                 
23 Plott (2000) reports evidence in some sessions of prices converging to a stable equilibrium with a price of zero.  
However in this price region of Plott's economy the traded commodity is actually an economic "bad" for sellers, who 
substantially improve their earnings relative to autarky by trading at a zero price (a net gain of $3 per period).  This 
stands in stark contrast to Gale's economy where agents give up all gains from trade as prices converge to zero or 
infinity. 
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emergent phenomena and the outcomes determined are not direct objects of individual choice.  
In the words of the 18th century Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson (1767), the outcomes are 
"the result of human action but not … human design."  
Much work remains to be done in this area.  A secondary result from our project (and 
Plott, 2000) is that dynamics do not readily or reliably adapt to shocks to excess demand.  
Further investigation may illuminate the causes of sticky dynamics.  As we point out in Section 
3, the special character of excess demand functions in the Gale example – excess demand 
increases as the economy approaches equilibrium – makes it difficult to estimate the structural 
relationship between excess demand and price movements.   High excess demand should induce 
faster price movement, but here high excess demand also coincides with diminishing marginal 
utility of consumption, possibly leading to slowdowns as prices approach corner equilibria.  
Studying less extreme, smooth variations on Marshall’s (1879) economy (using CES or 
quasilinear preferences) would avoid this complication and might yield a quantitative 
characterization. 
Finally, our experiment is designed to demonstrate the character and test the limits of 
dynamics.  Our units of observations are market cohorts; strong interdependence between subject 
decisions and endogeneity of key variables limit us from saying much about individual decision 
making with much confidence.  An important unexplored frontier is to use novel designs that 
exogenize excess demand (perhaps via carefully controlled shocks to endowments or 
preferences) within period to enable credible characterizations of how individual decision 
making operates in these markets.   
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